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Reasoning Consistently about Inconsistency
C.J. Hinde, R.S. Patching, R.G. Stone, D. Xhemali and S.A. McCoy
Abstract- Patching et al. and Hinde et al. in their work on
truth-space mass assignments, presented a semantic unification
function and a semantic separation function for mass assign-
ment logic that dealt with inconsistency. This paper takes these
two functions and while preserving the outside inconsistencies
shows how inconsistency can be reasoned about in a consistent
manner. This means that inconsistency that arises outside the
system need not enter the system, but needs to be represented
within the system, and can therefore be extracted appropriately
as output from the system to emerge as inconsistency on the
outside. The internal reasoning system need therefore only
concern itself with belief in truth, falsity and uncertainty.
I. Introduction
In earlier papers two operators were developed to in-
troduce evidence from an arbitrary object space into truth
space (1) and to extract object information from truth space
(2), Figure 1 shows the relationships. In both cases the
inconsistency present in the evidence was preserved to be
used within the reasoning system. We are concerned with rea-
soning about rather than with inconsistency. If a system can
be created that allows reasoning about inconsistency without
having to introduce inconsistency then the mechanisms of
the system are greatly simplified. The operation of semantic
unification as introduced by Baldwin (3) is comparable to
conditionalization (4) over interval probabilities. Semantic
unification is further defined in Section IV-A. Neither work
offers a treatment of unification or conditionalization as
applied to inconsistent evidence, however Dekhtyar defines
consistency. Separation has been referred to as abduction.
Abduction is the process which allows the precondition a of
Oa entails bO to be inferred from the consequence b. Sepa-
ration is a similar process whereby we perform the inverse
operation of semantic unification to calculate what the effect
on the world is of a set of claims that may arise or be present
in, a reasoning system. It is not defuzzification which may be
defined as the process of producing a quantifiable result from
a fuzzy set. Separation induces a fuzzy set in object space
from a claim in truth space. In the sense that a fuzzy set in
object space can entail a claim in truth space then separation
is indeed abduction, Baldwin (3) defines the operation but
does not give it a name. Semantic separation seems to be
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a reasonable complementary name to semantic unification.
Again, no literature exists apart from Hinde (2) that provides
a separation operation that deals with inconsistency.
Evidence World Consequences
Reasoning
Fig. 1. Showing the flow through unification, reasoning and separation.
Evidence is unified into claims, the claims form the basis for the reasoning
and then the consequences are separated from the claims to become real
world values.
A. Overview
Semantic unification and separation are treated as a linked
pair of functions in order to explore possible combined
choices. Section II introduces mass assignment sufficiently
to understand the paper, with an introductory section on the
notation used. Section III covers other related work which
underpins this work, including the concepts of semantic
unification and separation. Semantic unification maps knowl-
edge from an arbitrary domain to truth-space (2{TI1}) and
is explained in Section IV-A. Semantic separation moves
knowledge from truth-space (2{T I}) to an arbitrary domain
and is explained in Section IV-C. By considering both
operators together we find that there are more choices than
before and we can then make decisions about how we wish
to reason about things.
II. Mass Assignment
Mass assignment (MA) theory was introduced in 1991
by Baldwin (5) and later implemented in a programming
language. It is firmly based upon the counting of events and
has strong links to probability. Mass is a precise amount
of probability assigned to elements of the power set of a
domain (i.e. sets of events), rather than individual events
themselves. Each MA that has no mass assigned to the empty
set describes a family of probabilities.
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A. Notation
In this paper X and Y represent generic mass assignments
and R is the result of a generic semantic unification (see sec-
tion IV-A). Y' is the result of a generic semantic separation
(see section IV-C). C is a generic domain.
T is verum, a symbol denoting true and only true; I is
falsum, a symbol denoting false and only false. Together
they make the set of Boolean values {T, I}. We choose
to use T rather than t because {T} will be derived from
{T, I} by eliminating I whereas t will represent positive
evidence for true adding it to 0 to give {t}. Belnap (6) builds
evidence from ignorance and so we use {t, f} to represent
the build up of evidence and {T, I} to represent restriction
of possibilities. Whereas {T, I } allows both possibilities,
{T} indicates that true and only true remains, whereas btrue
indicates that there is evidence for t but there remains the
possibility that there might be evidence for f.
B. Mass assignment basics
The MA (X) is defined on the domain C and is written
as:
X =X1: 1,Xl, Xn: Xn
n
where xi = 1.0 and Xi e 2
t=l
The powerset of the domain C is denoted 2c. Xi is a subset
of the domain C (i.e. Xi e 2c) and xi is the amount of
mass assigned to that set. Normally a focal element Xi is
only written if xi is non-zero.
As stated, a MA describes a family of probability distri-
butions and a restriction of a mass assignment corresponds
to a subset of that family. MA theory has many types of
restriction, which move mass between focal elements. As
soon as combination of evidence arises the theory of MA
departs from Dempster/Shafer. MA supports the standard
fuzzy set operators of intersection and union as it does others.
In addition, the truth functions of conjunction, disjunction,
negation, etc. exist for MAs defined upon the domain of
Boolean values (i.e. {T, I }). MA operators are evaluated
by creating a mass assignment tableau, as described in (3).
If a mass assignment is to correspond to a family of
probability distributions then m(0) = 0. Mass assignment
theory (5) counts m(0) in its belief measure, the Transferable
Belief Model (TBM) (7), on the other hand, does not.
Following (1) the two belief functions are denoted as
Bel+ () if it includes the empty set and Bel-() if it does
not, the two plausibility functions are also defined:
Bel (Xi) = E X(yi)
YiCXi
Pl+(Xi) = E x( i)
Y3nxi7w0
VY3 =0
Bel (Xi) = E x(i)
x
07&Y3 C-Xi
P1 (Xi) = x(i)
x Y
Y?3oxi70
Where mx (S) is simply a function that returns the basic
mass assigned to the set S in the assignment X.
Together the two belief and two plausibility functions
make pairings. Bel+() and PI+() both consider inconsis-
tency, Bel-() and P1-() do not.
III. Context
Assignment to inconsistency corresponds to an assignment
of mass to 0 where both possibilities, T and I, have been
eliminated. The logic we will pursue restricts possibilities
and so moves from {T, I}, representing the possibility of
both true and false i.e. ignorance, through to 0 represent-
ing over restriction or inconsistent. Mass assignment is an
extension and rationalisation of Dempster/Shafer theory of
evidence (8) and (9) in that both use random sets and assign
mass to those sets. Belnap (6) addresses the problems of
reasoning with inconsistency but uses an evidential system
that increases evidence from ignorance, where nothing is
known, to having positive evidence whereas Baldwin (5) and
this paper restrict possible values from everything is possible
down to restricted values where all possibilities have been
eliminated. In the context of this paper Belnap introduces
inconsistency into his system by means of a setup, Baldwin
takes evidence from the world and introduces it into the rea-
soning system by means of a semantic unification operator.
Semantic unification is basically a specialised conditional
probability operator based on probability intervals which
allows claims to be made about the world conditional upon
the evidence of the world supporting the claim, Dekhtyar
et al. (4) address a similar problem on conditionalisation
for interval probabilities but do not address the treatment
of inconsistency. The complementary operator as addressed
in this paper, semantic separation, is a form of abduction
which takes the claims calculated by the reasoning system
and applies them to real world values. In this paper we
are primarily concerned with an inconsistent world and the
impact it has on these two operators and the structure of the
claims that a reasoning system may make about the world.
Dekhtyar et al. (4) propose a definition of consistency which
is shown in Definitions 1 and 2.
Definition 1: Let V be a set of random variables and P
dom(V) > 2[101] be an interval probability distribution over
V. A probabilistic interpretation Iv satisfies P(Iv l= P) iff
(Vl(x) C dom(V))(I,t < Ivz <
Definition 2: An interval probability distribution P
dom(V) > 2[10)] is consistent iff there exists a p-
interpretation Iv, such that Iv l= P.
Dekhtyar et al. follow this up with Theorem 1
Theorem 1: Let V be a set of random variables and P
dom(V) > 2[10)] be an interval probability distribution over
V. Let dom(V) = {Xl,... ,Xm} and P(xi) = [li, ui]. P is
consistent iff the following conditions hold.
(i) Lij<i I
(ii) L=l Vi >1
The following table allows us to explore the definitions:
m{} = 0.2 m{a} 0= .1
m{b}= 0.0 m{T} = 0.1
m{a,b} = 0.5 m{a,c} = 0.0
m{b,,} = 0.1 m{a,b,c} = 0.0
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This set of mass assignments is inconsistent as there is mass
assigned to the empty set. They also give rise to a set of
beliefs and plausibilities.
Bel+ ({}) = 0.2 PI+({}) 1.0
Bel+({a}) = 0.3 PI+({a}) = 0.8
Bel+({b}) = 0.2 PI+({b}) = 0.9
Bel+({c}) = 0.3 PI+({c}) = 0.4
Bel+({a, b}) = 0.8 PI+({a, b}) = 0.9
Bel+({a, c}) = 0.4 PI+({a, c}) = 1.0
Bel+ ({b, c}) = 0.4 PI+ ({b, c}) = 0.9
Dekhtyar's conditions for consistency are as below:
(i) Vc{C} Bel+(i) < Pl+(i)
(ii) Z{C}c Bel+(i) 0.8 < 1.0
(iii) £i=a} Pl+(i) 2.1 > 1.0
Clearly the equations above, and therefore the assignment,
satisfy Dekhtyar's definition. The table is inconsistent as as-
signment to 0 states that all possibilities have been eliminated
and so Dekhtyar's definition does not go far enough. In
dealing with probability intervals we need to consider the
families of probabilities and reduce the assignments to the
basic masses, from which beliefs and plausibilities may be
derived. The mass assignment above gives a similar result
for Bel- () and P Q().
IV. Semantic Unification and Separation
A. Semantic Unification
Patching et al. (1) derive a version of semantic unification,
shown in Equation 1 that deals with inconsistency.
(X Y) = R = {Rij: rij}
0 if (Yj = 0) A (Xi 7t 0)
|{T}if(Yj =Xi= 0)
R {T} if (Yj C Xi) A (Xi 0) A (Y #t 0)l{i} if (Xi nYj = 0) A (Xi 70) A (Yj #t 0)
{T,L} if (Yj n xi =t 0) A (Yj 7 Xi)
f{T,L} if (Xi = 0) A (Yj #t 0)
r XiYj (1)
In this definition, Equation 1, X is the claim and Y is the
evidence which supports the claim.
B. Claims
A claim is a mass assignment that purports to state a truth
about the world. Although claims may be true, the only way
to discover if they are actually true is to evaluate the claim
based upon some evidence.
We follow the path used by (1) and (2) by assuming in
the first place that all claims are unitary mass assignments
where all the mass is associated with a single focal element
i.e.
X = Xi: 1.0 A (VXj C Xj =# Xi) Xj: 0.0
In this paper we obtain valuations of claims following
semantic unification as it then becomes clear whether the
subsequent separation has behaved properly.
C. Semantic Separation
Hinde et al. (2) develop an operator, shown in Equation 2,
that deals with inconsistency.
(X Y) = R = {Rj: rj}
yil] {C Xi
if (Rj= {T})
Xi if (Rj= {I})
C if (Rj = {T, L})
0 if (Rj = 0)
y = xirj (2)
In Equation 2 X is the claim, (X Y) is the support that the
claim has given the consequence Y'. Y' is the consequence.
D. Discussion
These operators, semantic unification and separation, both
preserve inconsistency. The internal reasoning system there-
fore maintains and reasons with inconsistency. The next sec-
tion, and the focus of this paper, considers the combination
of the operators and places requirements on the operators
that insist that the evidence is recoverable.
V. Unification and Separation combined
This section begins with considering the requirements that
the pair of operators must satisfy regardless of the internal
representation of inconsistency. The main requirements of
this work are that the information that is entered into the
reasoning system is recoverable, if that is required.
A. Requirements
In this section Y is the token representing the evidence, X
and I as the claims made by the reasoning system supported
by the evidence Y, and Y' is the consequence that emerges
from the reasoning system. We require that Y and Y' are in
some reasonable sense equal.
The assumptions we shall use in this paper rest on unitary
claims X, and subsequently I, that are supported by the
evidence Y. The set of claims covered by Assumption 1
represent the claims that are based on consistent evidence,
whereas the claim based on Assumption 2 is that the evidence
is inconsistent. Under these two assumptions we are able to
state our requirements of the combined operator.
Assumption 1: X is a unitary mass assignment X = X1
1.0 and X1 #t 0
Under Assumption 1 the preservation of inconsistency
is not necessarily required, and so the following set of
requirements are made about the mass assigned to consistent
aspects of the evidence. Aspects of the evidence that are
not mentioned in the reasoning system have their mass
assigned to ignorance. The mass assigned to inconsistency
in the evidence Y could be preserved in the consequence
Y/, or ignored. If there is no claim about inconsistency
then it will be assigned to ignorance. If there is a claim
about inconsistency in the reasoning system then the mass
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assigned to inconsistency in the consequence will be taken
from ignorance.
Requirement 1.1: The belief measure, Bel-(), in the con-
sequence Y' must be equal to the belief in the evidence Y
of the claim X given the evidence Y. As X consists of the
set of subsets Xi this is expressed as:
Bel- (Xi) = Bel (Xi)
Requirement 1.2: The plausibility measure P1+() of the
consequence Y' must be equal to the plausibility measure of
any claim X given the evidence Y:
PY+ (Xi) = PI+ (Xi)
Evidence we are concerned about should be preserved into
and out of the reasoning process, however if the reasoning
process makes no reference to a piece of evidence then
the mass assigned to that evidence should be assigned to
ignorance. The consequences that are recovered from the rea-
soning system should also not have more belief, (Bel-()), in
them than the initial evidence, however their plausibility will
be affected by the preservation of inconsistency, or otherwise.
If the unification step takes no note of the inconsistency
of the evidence then inconsistency will become ignorance;
we are therefore concerned that P1+() is preserved but not
necessarily P1-(). It is quite reasonable to be unconcerned
that the world is inconsistent, but it is unreasonable for the
mass assigned to inconsistency to be transferred anywhere
but inconsistency or ignorance, they are both forms of
ignorance. This gives rise to the Requirement 1.3:
Requirement 1.3: The assignment of mass to inconsis-
tency plus the assignment of mass to ignorance in the con-
sequence Y' must be greater than or equal to the assignment
of mass to the assignment of mass to inconsistency plus the
assignment of mass to ignorance in the evidence Y:
m(0) + m(C) > m(0) + rn(C)
If we care about the preservation of inconsistency then
there must be a requirement to that effect. If we make no
assertions about how this inconsistency is transferred through
the reasoning system, this follows:
Requirement 1.4: The belief measure Bel+() in the con-
sequence Y' in inconsistency must be equal to the belief in
the evidence Y in inconsistency:
Bel+Y(0)= Bel+()
This last requirement is very similar to Requirement 1.1,
we are concerned that all aspects of evidence are treated
reasonably equally. These requirements are considerably
simpler and less restrictive than the requirements cited in
(1; 2) but apply to the whole process instead of to each
function separately. They do not constrain the reasoning
system to include inconsistency, but it must preserve it for
the consequences. The operators developed in (1) and (2)
satisfy the new requirements, as should some others.
B. Theorems
In general, if X = X1: 1.0 is an unitary claim, with all
mass assigned to a single focal element then a general piece
of evidence (Y) consists of four main parts when compared
to the generic claim X. They are:
1) The empty set 0
2) Focal Sets S = {Sp} where (VSp e S) Sp C
X1 A Sp # 0
3) Focal Sets D = {Dq} where (VDq C D) DqnX1
0 A Dq # 0
4) Focal Sets C ={Cr} where (VCr e C): CrOXnxi
0 A Cr 7 X,
These four sets describe all possible focal elements of Y
with respect to how they relate to X,. S is all the focal
elements that are subsets of X, (but are not the empty set,
which is a special case), D is all the disjoint focal elements
with respect to X1, and C is all the focal elements conjoint
with X1 but not a subset.
Y {0: m(0)}U {Sp: m(Sp)}U
{Dq: mr(Dq)} U {Cr: (Cr)}
The consequence (Y') consists of four main parts when
compared to the generic claim X. They are:
1) The empty set 0
2) Focal Sets Xi
3) Focal Sets C -Xi
4) Focal Sets C
These four sets describe all the focal elements of Y' and
how they relate to Xi, making up the consequence Y'.
We now address the relationship between Y and Y'
deriving Y' from Y through (X Y), this is:
yf {c
[C
0: m ({T})m(0)+ m (0),
X1: m ({T}) xm(Xi),
-X1: m ({I}) xn(X1),
C: m ({T, I}) m (Xi)+ (0) Mk(Xi)
(3)
Substituting to express this in terms of Y we get:
0: y(0),
Xi 1 mr(Sp),
Y/ = C -Xi: Erm(Dq),
DqGD
C: y(0) + E r(Cr)CycC
(4)
If we care about the preservation of inconsistency then we
need Requirement 1.4. It is straightforward to check that the
original unification and separation operators are still correct.
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Using the definition of semantic separation in Equation 2
on a unitary claim X, consisting of one element X1 the
separation of the general mass assignment claim X and the
general consequence Y' is given by Equation 3.
Theorem 2: The combined functions (Equations 1) and
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.1 (preservation of Bel-).
Proof: The belief in the general claim for the evidence
has not changed:
Bel-(Xi) E (Sp) = Bel (Xi)
The belief measures in X1 (Bel-) stay the same. C
Theorem 3: The combined functions (Equations 1) and
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.2 .
Proof:
P1+ (Xi) = m(0) + S M(S,) + 5 M(Cr)
SPES C,EC
PI+ (Xi)
Y
The plausibility measures (PI+) stay the same. C
Theorem 4: The combined functions (Equations 1) and
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.3 .
Pro of:
PI+(Xi) = m(0) + 5 M(S,) + 5 M(C,) = PI+(Xi)
SPES CcEC
The plausibility measures (PI+) do not decrease.
Theorem 5: The combined functions (Equations
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.4 .
Proof:
Bel+(0) = m(0) = Bel+(0)
1
1) and
The belief measures in inconsistency (Bel+) stay the same.
.
C. Reasoning about inconsistency
Section V-A dealt with the operators developed and refined
in (1) and (2) which dealt with inconsistency by carrying it
with the claim about the property we were interested in. It
is perfectly reasonable that we may not be interested in the
inconsistency and so we need an operator that can selectively
ignore inconsistency. For this to be achieved the claims
about properties need to have the inconsistency assigned to
ignorance, as would a claim about another property, such as
"greenness", when referring to "redness". We therefore need
a claim about inconsistency, I.
Assumption 2: The unitary mass assignment I represents
the claim 'The evidence is inconsistent' I= 0: 1.0
It is clear that introducing the claim I in Assumption 2
does not affect the transfer of belief from Y to Y' for the non-
empty sets. It only remains to check that the mass assigned
to inconsistency is correctly transferred through the claim I:
(I {T}) Y)0)
m ({T,L}) 1.0 -m(0),(IIY) y
Ym(0) m ( {T} m(0)(IlY) Y
Mass assignments to I contain no inconsistency but in-
consistency is restored as it is transferred to Y'.
There is no real need to transfer inconsistency into the
reasoning system if it can be restored on exiting. We may
need to represent the fact that inconsistency is a property of
the evidence. Rather than propagate inconsistency through
the reasoning we can reason about it just as any other
property. The use of inconsistency in the unification operator
may therefore be removed, but we still need to meet the
requirements above. A definition of a suitable version of se-
mantic unification is given in Equation 5. The only difference
between this operator and the one given in Equation 1 is the
topmost entry which changes from 0 to {T, I}.
(X Y) =R=
{T,IL}
{T}
{T}
{jL}
{T,IL}
{T,IL}
{Rij : rij}
if (Yj = 0) A (Xi 7t 0)
if (Yj = Xi = 0)
if (Y3 C Xi) A (Xi 7t 0) A (Yb
if (Xi n Yj= 0) A (X,,7# 0) A
if (Yj n xi #t 0) A (Yj 7 Xi)
if (Xi = 0) A (Yj #t 0)
#0)
(Yj # 0)
rij = xiYj (5)
Using the semantic unification operator defined in Equa-
tion 5 we transfer each property of the world into a claim
about the world, including inconsistency. If we examine the
operator as shown we see that in rows two and three the
component of X which represents inconsistency behaves
exactly as any other component. So if the claim contains
inconsistency then the operator will make use of it. Typically
the claims we are using are unitary claims and so a further
claim is required as defined in Assumption 2. The claim X
will assign any inconsistency in the evidence Y to {T, I}.
I will assign any inconsistency in the evidence Y to {T}.
An interesting by-product of this revised operator is that
both claims X and I represent families of probabilities and
it is now possible, and reasonable, to ask questions such as
"what is the probability that the evidence is inconsistent?".
By combining the claims and treating inconsistency as just
another property we may obtain various probability estimates
in the conventional way. Before we run away with the idea
that there has been no change from the original semantic
unification operators we note the original operators defined
in the work on Fril, (3) did not allow statements involving
inconsistency except to move all mass to unknown, {T, I}.
D. Resolution of inconsistency in the conclusions
The conclusion based on the claim X does not contain
any inconsistency, however it must be resolved with the
conclusion based on the claim I, which does contain in-
consistency. The most general solution to this resolution is
to take mass from the lower cardinality sets and not from
ignorance; whereas the solution we want is to take the mass
from ignorance and move it to inconsistency as we would
with any other property of interest. Pragmatically, we would
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start with the consequence resulting from I and then merging
other quantities as they are extracted from the reasoning
system by taking mass from ignorance.
Given that we employ the strategy advocated above to
resolve the unitary statements and mx (Xi) = 1.0 the
following equations relate Y to Y'.
0: 0.0,
{T}: 5 mn(Sp),
(X Y) = {I}: >E m(Dq),
DqGD
{TI} : mn(0) + 5 mr(Cr)
Cr E C
The plausibility measures (P1+) stay the same. U
Theorem 8: The combined functions (Equations 5) and
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.3 .
Proof:
Pl+(Xl) = m(0) + S m(SY)+ 5 m(C1)
Y/ y y y
SP EcS C, EcC
PI+ (X1)
y
The plausibility measures (PI+) do not decrease. U
Theorem 9: The combined functions (Equations 5) and
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.4 .
(6) Proof:
Bel+(0) = m ({T}) = Bel+ (0)
The belief measures in inconsistency (Bel+) stay the same.
U
The claim I consists of the single statement that the
evidence is inconsistent and mi(0) = 1.O.
(IJY)
0
{T}
{jL}
{T,I }
: 0.0,
m(0),
y
: 0.0,
: 1.0 -m(0)
y
So all I does is measure the degree of inconsistency in
the evidence Y.
The resultant Y' is then easily calculated as:
C
0: m ({T}) = m(0),
X1 E m(Sp),
X1: mr(Dq),
DqGD
C: E rn(Cr)
Cr E C
The mass assigned to C in (X Y) that is missing from the
final assignment, my (0), is precisely the amount assigned to
{T} in (I Y), and is precisely the amount assigned to 0 in
the final assignment. It is also precisely the amount assigned
to 0 in the original evidence Y.
We are now in a position to formally prove the revised
operators fulfil the requirements.
Theorem 6: The combined functions (Equations 5) and
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.1 (preservation of Bel-).
Proof:
Bel-(Xi) E (Sp) = Bel (Xi)
sY/YS
The belief measures in X1 (Bel-) stay the same.
Theorem 7: The combined functions (Equations
(Equation 2) fulfil Requirement 1.2 .
Proof:
5
5) and
P1+ (Xi) = m(0) + M(S,) + Mn(C,) = PI+ (Xi)
SPES C'eC
E. Eliminating inconsistency in the conclusion
So far we have concerned ourselves with the restoration
of inconsistency to the outside world. This may not be what
is required. The restoration of inconsistency was achieved by
mapping a claim I'n the conclusions to the claim (I Y)
within the reasoning system to restore inconsistency. All that
claim did was to take the token representing inconsistency
within the claim and restore inconsistency. We could just as
easily have taken a token w and used it just as we used Xi
to form our conclusion. The conclusion would then have two
components w and Xi, where Xi represents the consistent
components of the statement.
F Using a token w to represent inconsistency
Let the final set of claims be as above but with J' ={}:
1.0 replacing I' = 0: 1.O.
This is superficially reasonable and in many cases it may
well be adequate. However, if we examine the possible
movements of mass it becomes clear that although mass may
be moved downwards towards inconsistency, it cannot be
moved downwards towards {w}. It is also clear that care
must be taken in the internal reasoning process as mass
that would have been assigned to 0 is now assigned to
{T, I} thus allowing it to be moved downwards to other sets.
The reasoning system must be aware of the representation
of inconsistency. The property of inconsistency mentioned
above may be easily replicated by including w in all sets,
including C. The unification operator which achieves this is
given in Equation 7.
(X Y) = R = {Rij : rij}
f{w} if (Yj = 0) A (Xi :t 0)
|{w,T}if(Yj =Xi= 0)
R{w, T} if (Yj C Xi) A (Xi 7t 0) A (Yj #t 0)
R6j {w,T} if (Xi n Yj= 0) A (Xi7 0) A (Yj #t 0)
{w, i} if (Yj n xi =t 0) A (Yj Xi)
{w,T,L} if (Xi = 0) A (Yjit 0)
rij = XiYj (7)
y/:
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The corresponding semantic separation operator is given
in Equation 8.
(X Y) = R = {Rj: rj}
Xi if (Rj =
Y/ C -Xi if (Rj =tJ | :C if (Rj =
0 if (Rj =
{w, T}) V (Rj {T})
{w, I}) V (Rj {I})
{w, T, I}) V (Rj {T, I})
{w}) V (Rj = 0)
y x=irj (8)
The semantic separation operator shown in Equation 8 is
suitable for a reasoning system that preserves inconsistency,
represents it as a single unitary claim or represents it using
a token such as the one adopted in this paper, w. Clearly
the transfer of inconsistency into the reasoning system must
be performed by different semantic unification operators,
whereas separation can be performed by a single operator
suitably configured. To be consistent with the treatment of the
other operators we need to prove that the transfer is correct.
Theorem 10: The combined functions (Equations 7) and
(Equation 8) fulfil Requirement 1.1 (preservation of Bel-).
Proof: The belief in the general claim for the evidence
has not changed:
Bel-(Xi) m (Sp) = Bel-(Xi)
The belief measures in X1 (Bel-) stay the same.
Theorem 11: The combined functions (Equations 7) and
(Equation 8) fulfil Requirement 1.2 .
Proof:
PI+ (Xi) = m(0) + m(Sp) + Mn(C') = PI+ (Xi)
SPES C'eC
The plausibility measures (PI+) stay the same.
Theorem 12: The combined functions (Equations 7) and
(Equation 8) fulfil Requirement 1.3
Proof:
PI+(Xi) = m(0) + r(Sp) + (C') = PI+(Xi)
SPES C'eC
The plausibility measures (PI+) do not decrease.
Theorem 13: The combined functions (Equations 7) and
(Equation 8) fulfil Requirement 1.4 .
Proof:
Bel+(0) = m ({}) Be1l+(0)
The belief measures in inconsistency (Bel+) stay the same.
.
The use of or some other suitable symbol to represent
inconsistency allows us to use most of the usual operators in
our reasoning system except they need to take account of w.
VI. Conclusions
We have taken the semantic unification operator together
with the separation operator and extended the possible inter-
nal representations so that the reasoning system may reason
about inconsistency rather than reason with inconsistency.
The reasoning system does not need to represent the incon-
sistency as inconsistency, merely a claim about inconsistency.
A final operator designed to represent inconsistency within
the claims used the symbol w to be able to reason about
inconsistency and to preserve some of the properties of
inconsistency in that w is a component of all the possibility
sets.
The paper shows that if evidence can be entered into and
extracted from a representation then that evidence must be
represented correctly within the system. By only insisting
that evidence must be recoverable we have shown that a
variety of approaches may be taken, resulting in several
unification operators. Because the representation will already
have been chosen by the time extraction is performed the
semantic separation operator can be implemented as a single
operator that does not require modification depending on the
representation used.
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